Pacheco looked impressive stopping Immanuwel Aleem in the 11th round in July, but Aleem was chosen after troubling performances against Steven Nelson and Kevin Lele Sadjo. Sadjo dropped Pacheco, hurt him several times, and repeatedly crowded the taller fighter before losing a decision.
The damage went beyond one knockdown. Pacheco’s height becomes a liability when shorter opponents reach his chest because he needs room to extend his punches. His slow feet also make it difficult to regain that distance once it disappears. Buddy McGirt can sharpen Pacheco’s jab, positioning, and defensive habits, but he cannot give him faster legs.
Correcting every weakness is not necessary to make the investment profitable. Matchroom used a similar model with Edgar Berlanga, preserving his record and marketability until he secured the lucrative Canelo Alvarez fight. The objective with Pacheco may also be reaching a major payday rather than developing a dominant champion who clears out the division.
That explains the appeal of another Aleem-type opponent. Aleem applied enough pressure to produce an entertaining contest but remained available for Pacheco’s long punches. Pacheco rebuilt his image without proving that he can control a compact, technically polished fighter who forces him to fight short.
Lester Martinez represents the opposite kind of matchmaking. He is strong, skilled at close range, and brings far less financial reward than Jaime Munguia. Beating him would strengthen Pacheco’s credentials, but losing would destroy the larger plan before Matchroom reaches the payoff.
Sanctioning-body placement can keep Pacheco near a title opportunity without requiring Matchroom to volunteer for Martinez. The danger comes when an eliminator or purse bid removes control over the opponent.
Selective matchmaking can extend Pacheco’s run by keeping him away from fighters who expose his feet, inside defense, and punch resistance. Hearn’s “great fight” description means little until Matchroom supplies the name.
